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LECTURE
CASEBOOKS AND SCHOLARSHIP:
CONFESSIONS OF AN AMERICAN
OPINION CLIPPER*
by
E. Allan Farnsworth**

'' M

'R. Fox," the professor asked, "will you state the facts in

Payne v. Cave?" So, we are told, the case method of instruction began in the fall of 1870 at the outset of the contracts
course at the Harvard Law School.I The professor was Christopher Columbus Langdell, immortalized by Harvard's Langdell Hall. History, perhaps
charitably, does not disclose what Mr. Fox replied, but it was evidently not
such as to inspire Harvard to name a building in his honor.
Langdell, who spent sixteen years as a bookish lawyer in New York before
returning to his alma mater, was the first to compile an anthology of cases
for use in legal education. He had collected his cases the previous spring
and, when he put them in the hands of his students, the experiment was to
revolutionize legal education. My purpose here, however, is not to discuss
that experiment but to examine the anthologies that resulted from it. For
Langdell's publication of these cases the following year in a volume entitled
A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts ushered in what I call the Age
of Anthology in American legal scholarship. His volume began with Payne
v. Cave,2 which looked like this:
SELECT CASES ON CONTRACTS.
CHAPTER I.
MUTUAL CONSENT.
*This
is a revised and annotated version of the eleventh Roy R. Ray Lecture, delivered
at Southern Methodist University School of Law on March 30, 1988. The author has drawn
on Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1406
(1987) with permission of the Michigan Law Review.

** Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia University. The author confesses to

having recently revised E.
TRACTS (4th ed. 1988).

FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-

1. 2 C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 372 (1908). On the unfavorable reaction among Langdell's students, see Fessenden, The Rebirth of the Harvard Law
School, 33 HARV. L. REv. 493, 498-501 (1920).
2. 3 Term R. 148 (K.B. 1789).
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"Est sutem pactio duorum pluriumus in idem placitum consensus."

PAYNE v. CAVE.

1789.
[Reported in 3 Term Reports, 148.]
THIS was an action tried at the Sittings after last Term at Guildhall
before Lord Kenyon, wherein the declaration stated that the plaintiff,
on 22d September, 1788, was possessed of a certain worm-tub, and a
pewter worm in the same, which were then and there about to be sold
by public auction by one S. M., the agent of the plaintiff in that behalf,
the conditions of which sale were to be the usual conditions of sale of
goods sold by auction, &c., of all which premises the defendant afterwards, to wit, &c., had notice; and thereupon the defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the special instance and request of the
defendant, did then and there undertake and promise to perform the
conditions of the said sale to be performed by the plaintiff as seller, &c.,
undertook, and then and there promised the plaintiff to perform the
conditions of the sale to be performed on the part of the buyer, &c.
And the plaintiff avers that the conditions of sale hereinafter mentioned,
are usual conditions of sale of goods sold by auction, to wit, that the
highest bidder should be the purchaser, and should deposit five shillings
in the pound, and that if the lot purchased were not paid for and taken
away in two days' time, it should be put up again and resold, &c. [stating all the conditions]. It then stated that the defendant became the
purchaser of the lot in question for 401. and was requested to pay the
usual deposit which he refused, &c. At the trial, the plaintiff's counsel
opened the case thus: The goods were put up in one lot at an auction;
there were several bidders, of whom the defendant was the last, who bid
401.; the auctioneer dwelt on the bidding, on which the defendant said,
"Why do you dwell? you will not get more." The auctioneer said that
he was informed the worm weighed at least 1800 cwt, and was worth
more than 401.; the defendant then asked him whether he would warrant it to weigh so much, and receiving an answer in the negative, he
then declared that he would not take it, and refused to pay for it. It was
resold on a subsequent day's sale for 301. to the defendant, against
whom the action was brought for the difference. Lord Kenyon, being of
opinion on this statement of the case, that the defendant was at liberty
to withdraw his bidding any time before the hammer was knocked
down, nonsuited the plaintiff.
Walton now moved to set aside the nonsuit, on the ground that the
bidder was bound by the conditions of the sale to abide by his bidding,
and could not retract. By the act of bidding he acceded to those conditions, one of which was, that the highest bidder should be the buyer.
The hammer is suspended, not for the benefit of the bidder, or to give
him an opportunity of repenting, but for the benefit of the seller; in the
mean time, the person who bid last is a conditional purchaser, if nobody
bids more. Otherwise, it is in the power of any person to injure the
vendor, because all the former biddings are discharged by the last; and,
as it happened in this very instance, the goods may thereby ultimately
be sold for less than the person who was last outbid would have given
IN THE KING'S BENCH, MAY 2,
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for them. The case of Simon v. Motivos,' which was mentioned at the
trial, does not apply. That turned on the Statute of Frauds.
THE COURT thought the nonsuit very proper. The auctioneer is the
agent of the vendor, and the assent of both parties is necessary to make
the contract binding; that is signified on the part of the seller by knocking down the hammer, which was not done here till the defendant had
retracted. An auction is not unaptly called locus panitentia. Every bidding is nothing more than an offer on one side, which is not binding on
either side till it is assented to. But according to what is now contended
for, one party would be bound by the offer, and the other not, which
can never be allowed.
Rule refused.
S. Burr, 1921.
While it is not our habit to call the books from which you are learning the
law "anthologies," that is their essence. We can only conjecture that Langdell was inspired by Francis Turner Palgrave's famous anthology of lyric
poetry, The Golden Treasury, published only a decade before. We do know
that Langdell was already familiar with many of the cases in his anthology
from having assisted his teacher and predecessor, Theophilus Parsons, in
preparing footnotes for Parsons's treatise on contracts.
As one of the legion of American law professors that have followed in
Langdell's footsteps in editing anthologies, I have chosen to say something
to you about these works. The Roy R. Ray Lecture is intended especially
for first-year students, and the casebook is, after all, a type of legal literature
with which first-year students are all too familiar.
With what someone once called "mock humble arrogance," I have styled
my remarks "Confessions." At least some might think it arrogant to usurp
an appellation associated with Saint Augustine, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and
Thomas de Quincy-to whom I owe a special apology for having parodied
his title "Confessions of an English Opium Eater." De Quincy, you may
recall, was an early nineteenth century Oxford dropout and lifelong opium
addict who wrote fourteen volumes of elegant prose for the best of all possible motives-he needed the money.
Only after I had submitted the title did it sink in that the title required me
to find something to confess. And so I have three confessions-"mock humble" confessions, one might say. They are confessions shaped during the
more than two decades that I have shared with my colleague William F.
Young the responsibility of editing a casebook in Langdell's own field of
contracts-a casebook begun by distinguished predecessors a half-century
3
ago.
My first confession is to a nagging fear that as a casebook editor I am
redundant. Does the world really need so many contracts professors editing
so many casebooks? Your contracts teachers now have a choice among a
3. Our casebook, designated a "fourth edition," is in reality the eighth version of a work
begun by Edwin Patterson in 1935.
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score of contracts casebooks 4 on which some fifty contracts professors have
labored. Yet more casebooks by other professors are in the works. Would
one more or less make a difference? Here is a field in which product differentiation has become a high art. Contracts casebooks now come in a variety of
appealing shades of red, blue, brown, and green. They range in length from
well under a thousand pages to more than 1500, containing fewer than 150
cases to more than 250. While one teacher favors a particular casebook for
"the editors' respectful refusal to edit the heart out of" their cases, 5 a publisher touts another casebook as being "heavily enough edited" that students
are not "forced to struggle through unnecessary detail and discussion before
reaching the point of the case."' 6 How did there come to be so many contracts casebooks?
The revolution begun by Langdell never spread beyond the United States,
and even there it proceeded slowly. Although casebooks quickly replaced
texts as the grist for student learning at Harvard, the revolution was not
welcomed with open arms in most American law schools. Columbia's conversion to the case method was the next of importance and that did not come
until the 1890s under the deanship of William Albert Keener, whom Columbia had lured from Harvard. It was in 1898, more than a quarter-century
after Langdell called on Mr. Fox, that Keener published his two-volume
anthology on contracts, the first real rival to Langdell's. In the meantime, in
1894, Samuel Williston, teaching contracts at Harvard, added a second volume to Langdell's cases. 7 For another quarter of a century-until the
1920s-these two anthologies dominated the field.
Then, in 1921, two more contenders appeared on the scene. Arthur Linton Corbin of Yale and George Purcell Costigan of Northwestern both published one-volume contracts casebooks. Williston followed in 1922 with a
single volume cut from his two-volume anthology based in part on Langdell.
The total number of anthologies was now four, and one contracts teacher of
that time rejoiced that contracts teachers, "fortunate in having a choice between two such excellent classroom tools as the case-books of Professors
Williston and Keener," now had two more from which to choose. 8 Another
contracts teacher exulted that he now had "an imposing array from which to
choose." 9 Little could these commentators have imagined the variety available today.
Fueled by growth in the number of law students and the proliferation of
law schools, product differentiation took hold during the decade of the
1930s. In 1931 Grover Cleveland Grismore of Michigan was the first to
4.

LER,

G.

E.g., L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (4th ed. 1981); F. KESsGILMORE & A. KRONMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1986).
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstructionof ContractDoctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1004

5.
(1985).
6. Matthew Bender's circular letter of March 1988 on W. McGOVERN & L. LAWRENCE, CONTRACTS AND SALES: CASES AND PROBLEMS (1986).
7. Keener's two-volume set contained some 470 cases in 1800 pages. Williston's 1904
two-volume revision included some 460 cases in 1400 pages.
8. Oliphant, Book Review, 16 U. ILL. L. REV. 645, 645 (1922).
9. Grismore, Book Review, 20 MICH. L. REV. 373, 374 (1922).
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invade what he admitted was "a field in which the handiwork of masters is
already available."' 0 Harold Canfield Havighurst of Northwestern followed
in 1934, as did William Herbert Page of Ohio State in 1935, and Edwin
Wilhite Patterson of Columbia in the same year. Patterson's was an unwieldy but influential two-volume anthology designed to be used with a third
volume, edited by George Washington Goble of Illinois in 1937, in an eighthour contracts course. In 1938 George Knowles Gardner of Harvard
brought out yet another anthology, and in 1941 Patterson and Goble consolidated their three volumes into a single volume.
By the eve of World War II some ten contracts anthologies were on the
market. The post-war era saw new entries by Lon L. Fuller of Harvard in
1947, Addison Mueller of Yale in 1952, and Friedrich Kessler of Yale and
Malcolm Pitman Sharp of Chicago, both in 1953. Since World War II more
than two dozen contracts books have been on the market at one time or
another, and roughly a score are available today. Since the war, well over
fifty law teachers have devoted time and energy to the production of this
plethora of contracts-teaching materials.
You can understand how this proliferation might give rise to fears of redundancy. That is not to say that I intend to stop editing my own casebook.
Nor, I suspect, do others. As long as some 40,000 students crowd the firstyear classrooms, contracts professors-egged on by publishers-will be unable to resist the temptation to enhance their notoriety and fill their coffers
by attempting to capture a share of this market. And, in spite of this first
confession, so shall I.
My second confession is to a gnawing doubt as to the academic utility of
editing casebooks. In academic circles utility is measured in terms of what is
called "scholarship"-and casebooks are not regarded as scholarship. Dictionary definitions inform me that scholarship is what scholars write; and
one academic, Karl Klare of Northeastern, assures me that "[t]he first-year
casebook has been a medium of significant contribution to contracts scholarship."'" But my colleagues tell me the contrary, that when scholars edit
casebooks that is not scholarship. Thus, in many law school faculties
casebooks count for little in decisions to promote or to grant tenure. Some
years ago, distinguished scholars filled more than 300 printed pages in the
Yale Law Journal with a symposium on legal scholarship, and in all those
pages I detected only one brief reference to a casebook.' 2 Why are not
casebooks regarded as scholarship? At least in part because they are not
thought of as either creative or influential.
The early anthologists did not even try to appear creative. As one commentator said of contemporary constitutional law casebook editors, they
"frequently create the appearance of agnosticism with respect to particular
10. G.
11.
N.Y.U.
12.
(1981)

GRISMORE, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS iii (1931).
Klare, Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook (Book Review), 54
L. REV. 876, 876 (1979).
Symposium, Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 1114
(reference by Richard Posner to "the Hart and Wechsler casebook on federal

jurisdiction").
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outcomes and approaches." 1 3 The tradition is that the editor of a casebook
should be as neutral as the editor of an anthology of poetry might be expected to be. Indeed, the word "anthology" comes from the Greek and
means literally "a gathering of flowers." Like Palgrave's anthology of poetry, Langdell's anthology of cases was a true gathering of flowers, without
comment by the editor and unadulterated by extraneous material. Even
chapter and section headings were few and far between. Editorial presence
was slow to intrude itself in the face of this tradition. It began with
footnotes.
A quarter of a century after Langdell called on Fox, Williston adopted the
practice of dropping footnotes citing cases related to his principal cases.
These footnotes eventually became so bulky that when Williston compressed
his two volumes into a one-volume edition, a reviewer explained that the
elimination of "elaborate footnotes" had made possible this reduction in
size. 14
A half-century after Langdell called on Fox, Corbin went beyond Williston's practice by inserting a few bits of his own introductory text in his footnotes and by offering occasional opinions in his footnotes. Even this
restrained editorial presence evoked criticism from a reviewer who faulted
Corbin for sometimes using his footnotes "to present the author's views or
reasoning rather than as mirrors of the authorities ....

This is leading the

student and sometimes it will happen that he is led in a direction which the
instructor will think erroneous." 15 The illustrations given to support this
criticism seem innocuous today. For example, offense was taken at a footnote noting that "[i]n some cases it has been held that mere forbearance
to forbear,
cannot be a consideration and that there must be a promise
16
contract."
unilateral
a
of
possibility
the
overlooking
wholly
Costigan, whose anthology appeared in the same year as Corbin's, audaciously used footnotes that not only posed questions for the student but also
cited and even quoted secondary authorities. It was not until the mid-1930s,
however, that Patterson and Goble elevated the note material so that it was,
as one reviewer described it, "not printed in forbidding fine print at the bot'1 7
tom of the page" but "after the cases ...

in only slightly smaller type."

Patterson explained that he favored using questions and problems so that
discussion might be "less an impromptu dialectic between student and
teacher, in which the latter triumphantly pulls the rabbit from the hat, and
more a sustained exploration of implications which are fully sensed in advance."' 8 He was the first to describe his casebook as cases and materialssignalling a departure from the pristine anthologies of Langdell and Keener.
Some would carry this trend toward creativity very far indeed. Two de13. Lupu, Intergenerationalismand ConstitutionalLaw, 85

MICH. L. REV. 1390, 1393

(1987).

14. Amram, Book Review, 70 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 373 (1922).
15. Whittier, Book Review, 31 YALE L.J. 220, 222 (1921).
16. A. CORBIN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 267 n.40 (1921).
17. Woodbridge, Book Review, 24 VA. L. REV. 824, 825 (1938).
18.

1 E. PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS II vi (1935).
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cades ago Christopher Stone of Southern California urged that constitutional law casebooks become truly creative ventures by undertaking "the
formulation of approaches to constitutional law."' 19 Others say we have already departed too far from tradition. Thus Anthony D'Amato of Northwestern has recently lamented that
casebooks have evolved along the lines of becoming easier and easier for
students to read and digest. The old casebooks challenged the student
to think, to figure out why the cases were placed in that order, and what
the relationships were, if any, among a case and the ones preceding and
following it. The new casebooks tell the student these things.20
But were the old casebooks really as neutral as they appeared to be? Even
Professor D'Amato concludes that, "[i]n retrospect, the 'old' casebook editors were pretty subtle; their editorial work showed up not in notes and comments, but in the perceptive selection and ordering of cases that could
efficiently be used as vehicles for creative problem solving."'2 1 Lawrence
Friedman of Stanford goes further, arguing that "these bare, spare books
carried to its extreme a most striking characteristic of the style of teaching
they reflected. This was the Socratic masquerade: The art of saying every'22
thing while appearing to say nothing at all."
Some contemporary writers make much of the ordering of cases in supporting Friedman's thesis. Langdell's cases, within each topic, were largely
in historical order, much as Palgrave had ordered the poems in his anthology. But Mark Kelman, a Stanford professor active in the critical legal studies movement, notes that a "commonly used contracts text (Fuller and
Eisenberg) introduces nearly every section with a case expressing the privileged position, then poses limiting cases," and Kelman suggests that this
''surreptitiously communicates" the idea that acceptance of this position is
primary in legal education.2 3 Mary Jo Frug, a New England School of Law
professor active in the feminist movement, criticizes a leading casebook that
begins with Hawkins v. McGee, a principal case awarding expectation damages against a doctor who had performed plastic surgery on the hand of a
male patient, followed by Sullivan v. O'Connor, a note case awarding reliance damages against a doctor who had performed plastic surgery on the
nose of a female patient. Frug argues that this order puts down both the
reliance measure and women as secondary.2 4 And Karl Klare writes of
Fuller's "major innovation" in his 1947 anthology of putting remedies up
front, at the very beginning of the book, signalling the message that one
cannot "understand the nature of legal rights . . . without knowing what
19. Stone, Towards a Theory of ConstitutionalLaw Casebooks, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5

(1967).

20. D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism,

37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 485 (1987).
21. Id. at 486.
22. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 632 (2d ed. 1985).
23. M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 292 (1987).

24. Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM.

U.L. REV. 1065, 1099-1100 (1985).
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courts can and actually will do to and for litigants." '2 5
Yet even if the anthologies have had a kind of subliminal effect, this would
scarcely be regarded as "creative" in the sense that scholarship is expected to
be creative. Nor have casebooks qualified as scholarship in terms of their
influence on the law. Surely an editor of a widely used casebook might be
expected to have an influence on the law, if only through the students who
went out into the profession after having studied from the casebook. Williston reminded us that law teachers influence the development of the law "by
the direct influence of their teaching on their pupils" as well as "by their
'26
writings."
Yet in spite of the circumstance that for over a half-century a small
number of anthologies dominated the market and were studied by most law
students, their influence on the development of the law was slight. Even a
casual reading of judicial opinions will show that judges virtually never cite
casebooks. And, as the Yale symposium suggests, scholars also pay little
attention to casebooks. In fact, if one excludes book reviews, casebooks have
been largely ignored in legal literature of all kinds. I will speak only to the
influence of the contracts anthologists in two respects: on the cases that are
recognized as leading contracts cases and on the development of contract
doctrine.
The contracts anthologists had some influence on leading cases. The most
popular of their cases, reused in anthology after anthology, were to become
part of the taught tradition of American law, revered by the many lawyers
whose first acquaintance with the field came from reading those cases.
Where did the anthologists themselves get their cases?
Sometimes they were the by-product of other writing. Casebooks are in
many respects merely reflections of something else; here, reflections of the
editor's other work. Langdell got many of his cases from having been Parsons's student research assistant. Williston and Corbin both published their
first anthologies the year after publishing new editions of treatises originally
written by others. And it should come as no surprise that the anthologists
took cases from each other, the cases themselves not being covered by copyright laws. The anthologies reflected not only what the anthologists had
done but what others had done. Williston, of course, openly borrowed from
Langdell, as have many of us who have revised works of our predecessors.
Others not formally connected with their predecessors nevertheless acknowledge similar debts. And whether acknowledged or not, such debts are inevitable since future editors learned from then-existing anthologies. As Corbin
admitted, "[o]ne cannot use a particular casebook... for more than 15 years
without being greatly influenced by... the choice of cases. .".. -27 And it is
surely more than mere coincidence that so many future anthologists under25. Klare, supra note 11, at 882. The latest edition of this casebook, which no longer
begins with remedies, discards this "major innovation."
26. S. WILLISTON,

SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW

27. A. CORBIN, supra note 16, at x.

107-08 (1929).
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took to review earlier anthologists. 28
The early anthologists had a pronounced fondness for English cases.
Langdell himself was a notorious anglophile in choosing cases. He recalled
his contracts professor, Parsons, exhorting beginning students to study English decisions because "England governs us still, not by reason of force but
by force of reason."'29 Langdell took this to heart and nearly ninety percent
of the cases were-like Payne v. Cave-English. Most of the rest came from
the two northeastern states of New York, where Langdell had practiced law,
and Massachusetts, where he taught. Early casebooks by Langdell's
Harvard colleagues showed the same parochialism, and as late as 1950 one
of Keener's revisors confessed to an "old-fashioned fondness for the leading
English, Massachusetts, and New York cases."'30 Thus, the law reflected in
the early anthologies was largely English law.
Langdell's emphasis on English cases also served the end of what Grant
Gilmore called "the apparent unity of doctrine," 3 1 a matter of no small importance to a field dominated by the laws of now fifty different states. In
1823 Nathan Dane wrote in his Abridgement of American law that "the evil
to be feared in our country is [that we] will produce too much law and in too
great a variety."' 32 The heavy reliance on English cases was a counterweight
to this tendency. Cases from a single jurisdiction, England, gave an artificial
semblance of unity and rationality that could not have been accomplished by
the use of unconnected and perhaps conflicting cases from a variety of
American states.
The challenge to this dominance of English cases came not from later
anthologists but from a different quarter. In 1923 the American Law Institute was founded. As part of an ambitious attempt to formulate rules that
were representative of American common law, the institute undertook a Restatement of Contracts. The Restatement, in which Williston played a leading and Corbin a supporting role, was completed in 1932 and proved a
formidable competitor to the English cases so prized by the early anthologists. It, too, could be used to suggest an "apparent unity of doctrine." In
the 1933 edition of his anthology Corbin cautioned students that the Restate28. Thus John Dawson, whose casebook appeared in 1959, reviewed Kessler and Sharp's
casebook in 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 405 (1954); while Sharp, whose casebook appeared in 1953,
reviewed Fuller's casebook in 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1948); and Harold Shepherd, whose
casebook appeared in a second edition in 1946, also reviewed Fuller's casebook in I J. LEGAL
EDUC. 151 (1948). Gardner, whose casebook appeared in 1939, reviewed both Goble's
casebook in 51 HARV. L. REV. 188 (1937) and Patterson's two volumes in 45 YALE L.J. 1153
(1936); while Goble, whose casebook appeared in 1937, reviewed Costigan's third edition in 27
U. ILL. L. REV. 592 (1933). Havighurst, whose casebook appeared in 1934, also reviewed
Costigan's third edition along with Patterson's two volumes in 21 IOWA L. REV. 661 (1936);
and Grismore, whose casebook appeared in 1931, reviewed both Corbin's and Costigan's
casebooks in 20 MICH. L. REV. 373 (1922).
29. C. WARREN, supra note 1, at 312.
30. Wormser, Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 145 (1950).
31. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 55 (1974).
32. 1 N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW Xiv
(1823). The royalties from this book funded the academic chair occupied by Parsons, Langdell, and Williston.
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ment "cannot be swallowed like an oyster," but explained his "constant' 33references" to it as an "aid in the process of analysis and generalization.
For Corbin and his contemporaries the new Restatement served the end of
giving some "apparent unity of doctrine," much as English cases had done
for the earlier anthologists. While ninety percent of Langdell's cases had
been English and roughly half of Keener's and Williston's cases had been
English, the proportion had dropped to a fifth or less in the anthologies near
the time of World War II. Today's casebooks retain only a few of the most
durable products of English judges. American students still read Adams v.
Lindsel 34 (the "mailbox rule"), Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. 35 (the
"smoke ball" case), Dickinson v. Dodds36 (indirect revocation), Hadley v.
Baxendale37 (unforeseeable damages), Hochester v. De La Tour 38 (anticipatory repudiation), Raffles v. Wichelhaus 39 (the case of the ship "Peerless"),
and Taylor v. Caldwell4° (the "music hall" case). But to a large extent it is
the Restatement that now does for you what English cases did for Fox in
giving an "apparent unity of doctrine." Nevertheless, the Restatement was
not a contribution of the anthologies themselves, though two of the anthologists, Williston and Corbin, played a leading role in drafting it. The anthologies, rather, reflected the Restatement.
Now what of the influence on doctrine as contrasted to cases? To what
extent did the anthologists use their anthologies to influence the development of rules of contract law? Given their limited editorial presence, one
might suppose that they had little concern with this. But was there no subliminal effect? I shall hazard some observations on these questions drawn
from two areas that you know well. In both of these areas contract law
experienced an upheaval at the time when the early anthologists dominated
the market. Both involve important questions of the role of reliance in contract law.
The first question is: Can an offeror who has sought performance instead
of a return promise, an offeror who has made a unilateral offer, revoke the
offer once the offeree has relied by rendering part of the performance? If an
offeror promises $100 in return for the offeree's walking across the Brooklyn
Bridge and then revokes when the offeree is half-way across, is the revoca41
tion effective?
Langdell harbored no doubts on this. Since the offeror's "promise is made
in legal intendment at the moment when the performance of the consideration is completed," not until the bridge was crossed, it follows that the offer
33. A. CORBIN, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (2d ed. 1933) (emphasis added).
34. 1 B. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).

35. [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (C.A. 1892).
36. 2 Ch. D. 463 (Ch. App. 1876).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

(1916).

9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
2 E.&B. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853).
2 H.&C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
3 B.&S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
See Wormser, The True Conception of UnilateralContracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136-37
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may be revoked up to that moment. 42 Sixty years later, following an extensive debate in the law reviews, the Restatement propounded a contrary rule
in its section 45. Under that rule, once the offeree has rendered partial performance, the offeror is bound by an option contract and is not free to revoke. 4 3 To what extent did the anthologies exert an influential role in this
controversy? Almost none.
Langdell's casebook had only one case, Offord v. Davies44-an English
case-that touched on this matter, and then only in a dictum that he offered
in his Summary as supporting his view. Williston, who presumably shared
Langdell's view, also used a later Georgia case, decided in 1887, that seemed
to reflect this view. But he passed over two other American cases with
45
which he evidently disagreed.
Whether this was biased selection of cases is of little practical importance
because of a skirmish that broke out in the law reviews during World War I
over the merits of Langdell's view. 4 6 When Corbin's anthology appeared in
1921, he added two American cases to Offord v. Davies and devoted a long
footnote to the law review debate.4 7 The anthologies had begun to reflect the
law reviews.
How, then, did Williston, as Reporter for the Restatement, come to reverse his position and write section 45 only a few years later? Not, it seems,
as a result of anything in the anthologies of the time, but because the debate
in the law reviews convinced him that Langdell was wrong. Though the
anthologies of Williston and Corbin reflected their views on the controversy,
they seem to have had little impact on its resolution. The battle was fought
and won in the pages of the law reviews and not in those of the anthologies.
The second question is: Can a promisor who has made a gratuitous promise retract it once the promisee has relied on it? A hoary example is Kirksey
v. Kirksey, 48 handed down by the Alabama Supreme Court in 1845 and
holding that a widow's reliance on her brother-in-law's gratuitous promise
by moving her family did not make the promise enforceable. Restatement
section 90, the "promissory estoppel" section, counsels a different result.
Of course Langdell did not include cases from the remote state of Ala42.

2 C. LANGDELL, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 988 (2d ed. 1879).

43. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
44. 12 C.B. (N.S.) 748, 142 Eng. Rep. 1336 (C.P. 1862).
45. Williston used Biggers v. Owen, 79 Ga. 658, 5 S.E. 193 (1887). He omitted Plumb v.
Campbell, 129 Ill. 101, 18 N.E. 790 (1888), and Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal.
654, 67 P. 1086 (1902).
46. The first article was Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other Than a Counter
Promise, 23 HARV. L. REV. 159, 160-61 (1910). It disagreed with Langdell and was expanded
on by McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 HARV. L. REV. 644 (1914). Langdell's view was
defended in Wormser, The True Conception of UnilateralContracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136 (1916).
The debate was summarized in Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 195 (1917). A later short piece is Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers
for Unilateral Contracts by PartialPerformance of Service Requested, 5 MINN. L. REV. 94
(1921).
47. See A. CORBIN, supra note 16, at 190-91 n.2. Corbin's cases were Los Angeles Traction Co. and Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 A. 106 (1917).
48. 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
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bama in his anthology, but he must have agreed with it. Indeed the heresy
of section 90 would not have occurred to Langdell, who was trained in the
orthodoxy that a promise needed consideration or a seal to be binding. For a
mind that resisted the leap expressed in Restatement section 45, the larger
leap expressed in section 90 was inconceivable.
Keener was no different in this regard from Langdell. His 1898 edition
contained a New York case-holding a charitable subscription unenforceable
for lack of consideration, 49 but there was no hint that an alternative basis for
enforceability might have been overlooked. Nor did the law reviews produce
early discussions of the effect of reliance on a gratuitous promise comparable
to those that paved the way for section 45.
It was Williston who, in his 1920 treatise, first produced a thorough analysis of the subject. But he was cool to the recognition of reliance as a ground
for enforceability of promises except for charitable subscriptions. While
broader recognition was "by no means without intrinsic merit," he wrote, "it
is opposed to the great weight of authority." 50 His selections in the anthology of cases where reliance appeared reflected this view. His four cases included Kirksey v. Kirksey and the New York charitable subscription case
used by Keener, both of which ignored the question of reliance. 5' A foota charitable subscription might
note, however, admitted the possibility that
52
be enforceable if there had been reliance.
Corbin saw the matter differently. In his 1921 anthology, Corbin used
nine cases where reliance was involved, as opposed to only four in Williston. 53 Lest the reader miss the significance of these cases, Corbin introduced
them with a remarkably suggestive section caption: "Reliance on a Promise
as Consideration (Must Consideration be the Motive of the Promisor or the
Inducing Cause of His Promise?)." The message suggested by this title and
confirmed by the cases was plain: the doctrine of consideration was itself
sufficiently flexible that at least some gratuitous promises should be regarded
as supported by consideration even though the reliance on the promise was
not "the motive of the promisor or the inducing cause of his promise."
Corbin would have expanded the doctrine of consideration to include unbargained-for reliance.
By 1926, however, Williston had made a shift. In documents prepared in
connection with the Restatement, Williston suddenly found fault with Kirksey, saying: "The injustice of the result is manifest." ' 54 Apparently under
the prodding of Corbin, Williston was cautiously changing his mind-never
going as far as Corbin would have in expanding the doctrine of consideration
to encompass unbargained-for reliance, but going as far as section 90, an
49. Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N.Y. 517, 20 N.E. 352 (1889).
50. 1 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1920).
51. Id. § 139. Williston's two other cases were Devecmon v. Shaw Devries, 69 Md. 199,
14 A. 464 (1888), and Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, 60 N.E. 397 (1901).
52. See S. WILLISTON, supra note 50, § 139.

53. Corbin's nine included Williston's four.
54. ALI, COMMENTARIES ON CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT No. 2, at 18 (1926) (S. Willis-

ton, Reporter).
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alternative to consideration rather than an expansion of it. Corbin came
gamely to accept his partial victory, later writing that he generally "accepted
and followed" the Restatement analysis."5
But although Williston and Corbin, both notable anthologists, had played
central roles in the development of section 90, the impact of their anthologies on this development is questionable. It is not even clear to what extent
Williston's anthology reflected his view at the time he drafted section 90, for
its relevant part had not been significantly revised for two decades. Corbin's
casebook, on the other hand, surely reflected his view, but it had only a few
years to gain influence. What role it played in Corbin's attempt to push
Williston in the direction of recognizing reliance must be left to surmise.
But whatever one's conclusion as to this, neither the history of section 45
nor that of section 90 suggests that anthologists exerted a significant influence in the recognition of reliance in contract law. You can, perhaps, see
why all this might give rise to a gnawing doubt as to whether casebooks are
scholarship.
My third and last confession is to a persistent suspicion that editing
casebooks actually has had a deleterious effect on scholarship. For this I see
two reasons.
The first is that the anthologies drained the energies of editors who might
have engaged in more scholarly activities. Before Langdell, professors lectured; and to do so they had to organize and describe. In every set of lecture
notes was the germ of a legal treatise. After the revolution in law teaching
inspired by Langdell, professors taught from cases and could seek refuge in
the Socratic method to avoid organization and description. Since the
casebook has never taken hold in English legal education, the phenomenon
that I am describing is peculiarly American. One English observer, A.W.B.
Simpson, now at Michigan, has pointed out that with the case method there
came "a need for a type of literature that generations of American academics
have spent their energies producing."' 56 And another English academic,
William Twining, has observed that the "judgment of history may well be
that, for all its virtues, the American casebook tradition has been a major
brake on progress in American law schools, by absorbing energies which
might otherwise have been more fruitfully employed."15 7 In brief, one might
surmise that "opinion clipping"-like opium smoking-makes it difficult to
do much else.
The second reason is that the anthologies not only absorbed the energies
of contracts teachers, but they also diverted their attention from the world of
the bar to the world of the law student, at that time a student who was likely
to be less well educated and less carefully selected than the student of today.
Before the advent of the anthology, what was taught about contract lawand about law in general-reflected what was written about it. Story and
1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 193, at 190 (1963).
56. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principlesand the Forms of
Legal Literature,48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 677 (1981).
57. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 57 (1973).

55.
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Parsons wrote for practicing lawyers. With the coming of anthologies, what
was written about law began to reflect what was taught about it. The
anthologies became the grist for the teacher's scholarly mill. Professor
Friedman writes, with some hyperbole, that "Langdell drove the textbooks
and treatises out of the temple of legal education." 58 But if the temple was
ultimately emptied of "textbooks and treatises," in the sense of Story's and
Parsons's works, it was quickly refilled with student handbooks, the precursors of modem "outlines" and other paperback "student aids."
Law teachers, especially those of us who teach in the first year, cherish the
illusion that our use of anthologies stimulates the student's critical faculties
and develops independence of mind. This was the justification for the pristine quality of the traditional anthologies. We law teachers would rather not
think about the paperback "student aids" that permit survival-and perhaps
more-with little use of critical faculties and minimal independence of mind.
Poor Fox was caught by Langdell in 1870. If Fox had waited a year to
enroll, he would have had the benefit of the first of these aids. For the bound
version of Langdell's Cases that appeared in 1871 had as an index a remarkable outline. There the student could find the rule in Payne v. Cave under the
heading "bidding at auction." It was recorded in the index that bidding is
"a mere offer, and revocable until the hammer falls," citing to Payne v. Cave
on page one. The entry looked like this.
INDEX.
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER.
See

OFFER.

ABSENT.
See

OFFER.

AUCTION.
See BIDDING AT AUCTION.
BIDDING AT AUCTION.
Is a mere offer, and revocable until the hammer falls. Payne v. Cave, 1.
But see Warlow v. Harrison, 1 El. & El. 295, 309.
Fox's successors who used Langdell's casebook at the end of the decade
had the benefit of Langdell's Summary of the Law of Contracts, a 250-page
text that accompanied the second edition of the casebook. Unlike the earlier
works of Story and Parsons, which were addressed primarily to practitioners, the Summary was written primarily for students. Its sixteen chapters,
curiously arranged in alphabetical order, covered only the areas dealt with in
the casebook, and the list of cases discussed in the Summary is substantially
the same as that contained in the casebook. Langdell had written his own
"student aid." Had Fox had the benefit of the Summary, he could have
found the following: 59
19. It was decided in Payne v. Cave' that a bid at auction is in the
nature of an offer, which is accepted by knocking down the hammer;
58. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 624.
59. See C. LANGDELL, supra note 42, at 997.
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and perhaps it is too late to question the correctness of the decision. On
principle, however, it is open to much doubt. The true view seems
rather to be, that the seller makes the offer when the article is put up,
namely, to sell it to the highest bidder; and that, when a bid is made,
there is an actual sale, subject to the condition that no one else shall bid
higher. This view was urged by the plaintiff's counsel. If the bidder can
retract at any time before the hammer falls, so also can the seller; and
hence a bid will secure no right to the bidder, whether there is any
higher bid or not. The article may be withdrawn, if the bidding is not
satisfactory, though it were put up with the express announcement that
it should be sold to the highest bidder. That the decision in Payne v.
Cave has not been acquiesced in by sellers at auction appears from the
frequent attempts that have been made to render bids irrevocable by a
provision to that effect inserted in the conditions of sale.' That such
attempts are unavailing is no argument in favor of Payne v. Cave, but
rather the contrary.
3 T. R. 148, Cas. on Contra. 1.
2 Compare Warlow v. Harrison, 1 El. & El. 295, 309.
3 Dart on Vendors (5th ed.), 124.
Thus no sooner had the anthology been introduced than means were needed
to lessen its rigors, and much energy was channeled into providing those
means. Langdell's Summary was not alone. In 1896 Edward Avery Harriman of Northwestern published a small volume "intended especially for the
use of students" that had indications of where the cases he discussed were to
6
be found in the anthologies of Langdell and Williston and of Keener. 0
There were other similar works. Indeed, in 1906, when Williston brought
61
out an American edition of Pollock's English textbook on contracts,
Corbin offered the wry comment that Williston's Pollock
may be used with great convenience in connection with Professor Williston's recent [1904] collection of cases on contracts, the notes in which
frequently appear bodily in the new edition of Pollock, and the cases
printed therein at length [in most chapters] being very largely the ones
discussed and criticised by Pollock ...

and by the American editors

62

One supposes that this bit of advice was not lost on first-year students looking for help in plowing through Williston's two-volume anthology. To understand his anthology they could read Pollock-Williston's "student aid."
(In this regard it is well to recall that the original anthologies contained
roughly twice as many cases as the present-day casebooks.) You can see
how these developments might contribute to a persistent suspicion that editing casebooks has had a deleterious effect on scholarship.
Thus my three confessions. I cannot say that I feel contrite, nor am I
likely to get absolution, since at this very moment my publisher is trumpeting the virtues of yet another new edition of our contracts casebook. Is it
60. E. HARRIMAN, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii (1896).
61. The book was entitled Wald's Pollock on Contracts.
62. Corbin, Book Review, 15 YALE L.J. 310, 311 (1906).
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needed? Is it scholarship? Will it hurt scholarship? When you return to
your usual places and open your casebooks-or your "student aids"-you
may not retain much interest in these questions. But I hope that you will
have a little better understanding of how, during a little more than a century,
today's casebooks came to be.

